Introduction

1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and
truth, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most
time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind,
a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed
with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is, we see
the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common
sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part
easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears
unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any
want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of
becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and
instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, to reason,
meditate, and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples
spring up in our minds concerning those things which before we
seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all
parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct
these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes,
difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us
as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered
through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were,
or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.
2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or
the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is
said, the faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature
for the support and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the
inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man
being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it
is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and
contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate
itself, it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by
that which is finite.
3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the
fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use
we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions
from true principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be
maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt
more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong
desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their
reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of
Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the
creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly
made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am
inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those
difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up
the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves- that we have
first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.
4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those
Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and
uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several
sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought our
ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness
and limitation of our faculties. And surely it is a work well
deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First
Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all
sides, especially since there may be some grounds to suspect that
those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in
its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and
intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so
much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might
have been avoided.
5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when
I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in
the like designs, yet I am not without some hopes- upon the
consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest,
and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object
nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that
which had escaped far better eyes.
6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier
conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of
Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the
unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my
design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in
rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have
occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts
of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of
framing abstract ideas or notions of things. He who is not a perfect
stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs
acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract ideas.
These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of
those sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of
all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and
sublime learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question
handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the
mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.
7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things
do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from
all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several
in the same object. But, we are told, the mind being able to
consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities
with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract
ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object extended,
coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving
into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself,
exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension,
colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to
exist without extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by
abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion
exclusive of both colour and extension.
8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions
perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all, and
some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which
distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or singles out
by itself that which is common, making thereof a most abstract idea of
extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any
figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all
these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular
colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from
another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an idea
of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor
any other determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering
motion abstractedly not only from the body moved, but likewise from
the figure it describes, and all particular directions and velocities,
the abstract idea of motion is framed; which equally corresponds to
all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense.
9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or
modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental separation,
attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings which include
several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having observed
that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in certain common
agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex
or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular
man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common
to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars
equally partake- abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those
circumstances and differences which might determine it to any
particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come by
the abstract idea of man, or, if you please, humanity, or human
nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there
is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor
black, nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular
colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included stature,
but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle
stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the
rest. Moreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that
partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the
mind, leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining
those only which are common to all the living creatures, frames the
idea of animal, which abstracts not only from all particular men,
but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent parts
of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and
spontaneous motion. By body is meant body without any particular shape
or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals,
without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet
naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the
distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason
left out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account the spontaneous
motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is
nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to
conceive.
10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting
their ideas, they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a
faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those
particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and
dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper
parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand,
the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the
rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must
have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I
frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a
straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I
cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above
described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract
idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither
swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be
said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I
own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some
particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which,
though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may
really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract from one
another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is
impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general
notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid- which
last are the two proper acceptations of abstraction. And there are
grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my
case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never
pretend to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not
to be attained without pains and study; we may therefore reasonably
conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the
learned.
11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the
doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that
inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from
common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly
esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given it very much
countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas
is what puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt
man and beast. "The having of general ideas," saith he, "is that which
puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an
excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto.
For, it is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of
general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to
imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making
general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other general
signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we may suppose that
it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men,
and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated,
and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have
any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them),
we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me
that they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they
have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive
them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those
narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them
by any kind of abstraction."- Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10
and 11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties
of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be
made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a
great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their
number. The reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to
think brutes have abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them
no use of words or any other general signs; which is built on this
supposition- that the making use of words implies the having general
ideas. From which it follows that men who use language are able to
abstract or generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing
of the author will further appear by his answering the question he
in another place puts: "Since all things that exist are only
particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: "Words
become general by being made the signs of general ideas."- Essay on
Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But it seems that a word becomes
general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but
of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently
suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of
motion is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever
has extension is divisible," these propositions are to be understood
of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will not
follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without a
body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or that I
must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which is
neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black,
white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only
implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether it be
swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever
object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the
other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line,
surface, or solid, whether of this or that magnitude or figure.
12. By observing how ideas become general we may the better judge
how words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny
absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any
abstract general ideas; for, in the passages we have quoted wherein
there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are
formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9.
Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what
we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which,
considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made
to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is
demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He
draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in
itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its
signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all
particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is
demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general.
And, as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign,
so the name "line," which taken absolutely is particular, by being a
sign is made general. And as the former owes its generality not to its
being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular
right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought
to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the various
particular lines which it indifferently denotes.
13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of
abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall
add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV.
vii. 9) which is as follows: "Abstract ideas are not so obvious or
easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If
they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and
familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon
them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances
of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily
offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not
require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle
(which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and
difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither
equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at
once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an
idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas
are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need
of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the
conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both
which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to
suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is
enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not
those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such
as its earliest knowledge is conversant about."- If any man has the
faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here
described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor
would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and
certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And
this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to perform. What more
easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there
try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall
correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea
of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral,
equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?"
14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry
with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them.
And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and
labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular
objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are
conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural
consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the
forming abstract ideas was not necessary for communication, which is
so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they
seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant and
familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time
it is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and
furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It
cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not
conscious of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the
business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied
labour of framing abstract notions will be found a hard task for
that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of
children cannot prate together of their sugar-plums and rattles and
the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked
together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds
abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common name they
make use of?
15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the enlargement of
knowledge than for communication. It is, I know, a point much insisted
on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal
notions, to which I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me
that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised-
universality, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the
absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the
relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it;
by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their
own nature particular, are rendered universal. Thus, when I
demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is to be supposed
that I have in view the universal idea of a triangle; which ought
not to be understood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which
was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; but only that
the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it
matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear
triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. All which
seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it.
16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to
be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it
demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees
to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some
one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally
belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not the same
with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of
an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I
cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles
which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems
therefore that, to be certain this proposition is universally true, we
must either make a particular demonstration for every particular
triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the
abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the particulars do
indifferently partake and by which they are all equally represented.
To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst I
make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles
rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may
nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles,
of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right
angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at
all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in
view includes all these particulars, but then there is not the least
mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said
the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a
right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the same
length. Which sufficiently shows that the right angle might have
been oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all that the
demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I
conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I
had demonstrated of a particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and
not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a
triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a
figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular
qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may
abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract,
general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may
consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal
without framing the fore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or
of animal, inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered.
17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the
Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through all the
manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which their
doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them
into. What bickerings and controversies, and what a learned dust
have been raised about those matters, and what mighty advantage has
been from thence derived to mankind, are things at this day too
clearly known to need being insisted on. And it had been well if the
ill effects of that doctrine were confined to those only who make
the most avowed profession of it. When men consider the great pains,
industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the
cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that
notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remains full
of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to
have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the
most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which
are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that,
taking all together, a very small portion of them does supply any real
benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion
and amusement- I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw
them into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this
may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles that have
obtained in the world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath
a more wide and extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men
than this of abstract general ideas.
18. I come now to consider the source of this prevailing notion, and
that seems to me to be language. And surely nothing of less extent
than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion so
universally received. The truth of this appears as from other
reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of
abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming;
from which it is a clear consequence that if there had been no such
things as speech or universal signs there never had been any thought
of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human
Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein words have
contributed to the origin of that mistake.- First then, it is
thought that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and
settled signification, which inclines men to think there are certain
abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true and only
immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by the
mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify
any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one
precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they
all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All
which doth evidently follow from what has been already said, and
will clearly appear to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will
be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby
restrained to one certain signification. For example, a triangle is
defined to be "a plain surface comprehended by three right lines,"
by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other.
To which I answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the
surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are
long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are
inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, and
consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the
signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name
constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand
everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other
useless and impracticable.
19. But, to give a farther account how words came to produce the
doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a
received opinion that language has no other end but the
communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an
idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that names which
yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark out
particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they
stand for abstract notions. That there are many names in use amongst
speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate,
particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will
deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary
(even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for
ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding
the ideas they are made to stand for- in reading and discoursing,
names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in
which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to
proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter
suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed
to stand for.
20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the
chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are
other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or
deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular
disposition- to which the former is in many cases barely
subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be
obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the
familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with
himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in hearing or
reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred,
admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind
upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming
between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas
that were fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it
will be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the
hearing of the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately
attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produced
by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. May we not,
for example, be affected with the promise of a good thing, though we
have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with
danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of any
particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea
of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little
reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will
evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the
propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks
of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the
hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with
a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that
are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells
me "Aristotle hath said it," all I conceive he means by it is to
dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission
which custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often so
instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to
resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is
impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation
should go before. Innumerable examples of this kind may be given,
but why should I insist on those things which every one's experience
will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?
21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas.
We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest
patrons; and endeavored to show they are of no use for those ends to
which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to
the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be
language.- It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in
that by their means all that stock of knowledge which has been
purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men in all ages and
nations may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one
single person. But at the same time it must be owned that most parts
of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse
of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered. Since
therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, whatever
ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into
my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names
which long and constant use hath so strictly united with them; from
which I may expect to derive the following advantages:
22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies
purely verbal- the springing up of which weeds in almost all the
sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound
knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself
out of that fine and subtle net of abstract ideas which has so
miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men; and that with this
peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious was
the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared
and faster held therein. Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts
to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be
mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I
cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It
is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike
or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or
disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are
included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more
requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own
understanding.
23. But the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose an
entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly
promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so
early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words
and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much increased
by the doctrine of abstraction. For, so long as men thought abstract
ideas were annexed to their words, it doth not seem strange that
they should use words for ideas- it being found an impracticable thing
to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which
in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the
principal cause why those men who have so emphatically recommended
to others the laying aside all use of words in their meditations,
and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it
themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd
opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of
words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, that
we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from
the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may
be they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due
regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate
use of words was to signify ideas, and that the immediate
signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea.
24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater
ease prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no
other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find
out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that
knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the
labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were,
therefore, to be wished that everyone would use his utmost
endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider,
separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which
so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention.
In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the
entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned
men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity- we need only draw the
curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit
is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.
25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge
from the embarras and delusion of words, we may make infinite
reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from
consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only
lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled
in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the
following sheets, I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his
own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in
reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy
for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out
of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see how he
can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised
ideas.